Reviewed Works:Murray G. Bell, J. Streprans, S. Watson, Spaces of Ideals of Partial Functions.Alan Dow, Compact Spaces of Countable Tightness in the Cohen Model.Peter J. Nyikos, Classes of Compact Sequential Spaces.Franklin D. Tall, Topological Problems for Set-Theorists.

Economics has developed into one of the most specialised social sciences. Yet at the same time, it shares its subject matter with other social sciences and humanities and its method of analysis has developed in close correspondence with the natural and life sciences. This book offers an up to date assessment of economics in relation to other disciplines. -/- This edited collection explores fields as diverse as mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, sociology, architecture, and literature, drawing from selected contributions to the (...) 2005 Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET). There is currently much discussion at the leading edges of modern economics about openness to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology. But what we see here is that economics has drawn on (as well as contributed to) other disciplines throughout its history. In this sense, in spite of the increasing specialisation within all disciplines, economics has always been an open discipline and the chapters in this volume provide a vivid illustration for this. -/- Open Economics is a testament to the intellectual vibrancy of historical research in economics. It presents the reader with a historical introduction to the disciplinary context of economics that is the first of its kind, and will appeal to practising economists and students of the discipline alike, as well as to anybody interested in economics and its position in the scientific and social scientific landscape. -/- Table of Contents -/- Introduction: Economics in relation to other disciplines Richard Arena, Sheila Dow and Matthias Klaes Part I. Economics in relation to the humanities and social sciences 1. The social science of economics Brian J. Loasby 2. Economics and literature Bruna Ingrao 3. Happiness: what Kahneman could have learnt from Pietro Verri Pier Luigi Porta Part II. Economics in relation to the life and natural sciences 4. Newtonian physics, experimental moral philosophy and the shaping of political economy Sergio Cremaschi 5. Evolutionary biology and economic behaviour: re-visiting Veblen's instinct of workmanship Mark Harrison 6. Medicine and economics in pre-classical economics Alain Clément and Ludovic Desmedt Part III. Economics and mathematics 7. Mathematics as the role model for neoclassical economics Nicola Giocoli 8. The role of econometric method in economic analysis: A reassessment of the Keynes-Tinbergen debate, 1938-43 Giovanna Garrone and Roberto Marchionatti IV. Economics and architecture 9. Economics and architecture Maurice Lagueux 10. Economic policies and urban development in Latin America Michele Alacevich and Andrea Costa V. Economics and geography 11. ‘Space’ in economic thought Giovanna Vertova 12. Economics, geography and colonialism in the writings of William Petty Hugh Goodacre Part VI. Economics and sociology 13. Economics and sociology: Gustav Schmoller and Werner Sombart on social differentiation Joachim Zweynert 14. Is Homo Oeconomicus a 'bad guy'? Isabelle This Saint-Jean -/- . (shrink)

This paper provides a survey of philosophical discussion of the "the Turing Test". In particular, it provides a very careful and thorough discussion of the famous 1950 paper that was published in Mind.

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

Contrairement à ce que peut suggérer l ’ expression de lumière naturelle lorsqu ’ il en est question, le cogito n ’ est pas une vérité de la raison. La raison est révoquée en doute au moment où il survient et ne saurait donc en assurer la vérité. Ce rôle est dévolu à la réflexivité de l ’ acte par lequel la pensée se constitue son propre objet lorsqu ’ elle affirme Je suis : immédiatement accessible à elle-même, c ’ (...) est une chose dans le monde, et par conséquent un existant, qu ’ elle saisit ainsi, non pas une représentation. Le cogito est ainsi inextricablement impliqué dans un acte certes, mais cet acte n ’ est pas le performatif qu ’ a voulu en faire Hintikka. La proposition qui l ’ exprime s ’ apparente en fait à une contingente : selon l ’ analyse ici proposée, il lui est en effet possible d ’ être fausse. (shrink)

Il est une question fondamentale dont il semble pourtant qu’elle n’ait pas été posée: celle de savoir ce qui fait que le cogito soit effectivement un principe métaphysique, c’est-à-dire une vérité première. Il semble aussi que ce qui d’ordinaire tient lieu de réponse à cette question dans l’esprit des lecteurs de Descartes, c’est le sentiment vague qu’il s’agit là de la première vérité qui surgisse après la dévastation laissée par le doute universel de la Première Méditation, ou peut-être qui surgisse (...) au cœur de ce doute, puisque le doute ne s’autodétruit que pour faire place à ego sumOr s’en tenir à cela pour justifier le statut de principe métaphysique du cogito, c’est confondre priorité chronologique et primauté métaphysique ou épistémique: en effet, qu’y aurait-il dans le seul fait de se présenter ainsi qui assure que le cogito doive fonder d’autres connaissances, d’éventuelles sciences? Qu’est-ce qui empêcherait aussi qu’il ne soit lui-même assujetti à d’autres connaissances, plus fondamentales, et dont le méditant ne se serait peut-être pas encore aperçu? Il est vrai que cette confusion est compréhensible, puisque la primauté métaphysique du cogito coïncide effectivement avec sa priorité dans l’ordre des connaissancesMais dans le doute ambiant, celle-ci n’est en réalité qu’un effet de celle-là, et le simple fait de constater l’une ne revient pas à être assuré de l’autre. Il ne peut s’agir donc que d’une coïncidence, et la question se pose dès lors de savoir comment se traduit sa primauté, c’est-à-dire comment doivent se concevoir ses rapports avec le reste de nos éventuelles connaissances. (shrink)

Le seul fait qu'il surgisse après que tout a été révoqué en doute ne suffit pas à faire du cogito-plus précisément, de ego sum - un principe métaphysique, une vérité première: la chose doit être démontrée. Or cette démonstration est bien là, dans la II e Méditation. Elle se fait en deux temps: y participent (a) l'expérience du morceau de cire et (b) le bref recours à l'imagination (AT VII, 27-28; IX/1, 21-22) par lequel Descartes vise à déterminer s'il est (...) davantage qu'une res cogitans. Ainsi s'explique la rémanence dans le texte de cette tentative que Descartes qualifie d' «erreur», et qui aura pu paraître redondante à ses lecteurs. (shrink)

In the discourse of 18th-century British intellectuals the term 'luxury' held a well-recognized and much disputed place. Dispute arose chiefly around the problem of disentangling the economic, moral-theological and political strands of the term. The object of the present paper is to trace forward the history of debate over the concept along one develop ing line of specialization - that of 19th-century political economy. It will be seen how the term luxury (and related terms: necessity, decency, productive, unproductive, etc.) adjusted (...) meaning(s) as the economic, social and intellectual contexts in which it was embedded themselves mutated. In particular, it is argued, the changing significance attached to the term illustrates the extent to which a key 19th-century intellec tual elite managed to accommodate the implications of a transition from a society based on assumptions of scarcity and hierarchy to one that was beginning to contemplate the possibility of mass market abun dance. While the profession's leaders did develop a sharpened interest in aspiration to luxury consumption as a legitimate motor of economic growth, all registered their disapproval of certain forms of the aspira tion, revealing in the process a variety of class, gender and 'race' pre occupations - including (from J. S. Mill onwards) a particular distaste for positional or status-related consumption. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. (...) The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding. (shrink)

The Facts of Causation claims to be a “complete account of causation and its implications.” Mellor's concern is with singular causation; that is, where causes and effects are singular ). Singular causes and effects come in two sorts. Firstly, there are facts. Facts are actual states of affairs, and states of affairs correlate with whatever can be expressed in a sentence. For example, that Don falls and that Don dies are facts, if actual. In general terms, the causation of one (...) fact, E, by another, C, fits under the designation ‘E, because C’. (shrink)

There is now a considerable literature on Michel Foucault but this is the first monograph which explicitly addresses his influence and impact upon education. Personal autonomy has been seen as a major aim, if not the aim of liberal education. But if Foucault is correct that personal autonomy and the notion of the autonomous person are myths, then the pursuit of such an aim by educationalists is misguided. The author develops this critique of personal autonomy and liberal education from the (...) writings of Foucault, and also considers Foucault's own educational practices. The author, James Marshall, who lives in New Zealand, has already written several articles for academic journals on Foucault. (shrink)

Scientific realism has been advanced as an interpretation of the natural sciences but never the behavioral sciences. This book introduces a novel version of scientific realism, Measured Realism, that characterizes the kind of theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences that is uneven but indisputable. It proposes a theory of measurement, Population-Guided Estimation, that connects natural, psychological, and social scientific inquiry. Presenting quantitative methods in the behavioral sciences as at once successful and regulated by the world, the book will (...) engage philosophers of science, historians of science, sociologists of science, and scientists interested in the foundations of their own disciplines. Part I introduces measured realism beginning with a novel realist theory of measurement (Population-Guided Estimation, or PGE). It examines two other versions of scientific realism — minimal (Hacking) and robust (Boyd, Putnam, and Newton-Smith) — and advances measured realism as best supported by the evidence in the behavioral sciences. It also critically evaluates the anti-realist arguments of van Fraassen, Laudan, and Fine. Part II formulates and develops a version of epistemological naturalism most appropriate to measured realism. Drawing upon the realist theory of measurement developed earlier, it favorably appraises a variety of statistical methods in the behavioral sciences against selected criticisms. It concludes that traditional, narrative methods in the behavioral and social sciences are unreliable by the measures of epistemological naturalism. (shrink)

(2002). Philosophy of Science 72 (January), 198-208.